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NOTES
REAL PROPERTY - HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS - THE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF HOMESTEAD.- Embodied in the Consti-
tution of North Dakota is a provision that the "right of the debtor
to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life shall be recognized
by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to all heads of
families a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and
defined by law. ... "I This section is not self-executing2 and from
the adoption of the Constitution in 1889 until the present 3 the
North Dakota Legislative Assembly has concerned itself with the
provision's implementation.
Any discussion of the law of homestead in this state must com-
mence with recognition of the fact that it represents an attempt to
achieve two complementary but nevertheless distinctly different
objectives. One of these objectives is, as the constitutional pro-
vision makes evident, the securing from the claims of creditors of a
core of property sufficient to permit the subsistence of a family
even in the face of the most severe financial reverses. 4 Thus, the
rights devolving upon a claimant who complies with the statutory
prerequisite culminate in exempting the homestead property from
levy and execution. This right is commonly termed a homestead
"exemption."
But a further objective is to provide a substitute for the common
law institutions of dower and curtesy, both of which are abolished
in this state,5 and thus to provide support and protection for a
person left otherwise unsupported by the death of a spouse or
1. N.D. Const., Art. XVII, §208.
2. Roesler & White v. Taylor, 3 N.D. 546, 58 N.W. 342 (1894).
3. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of North Dakota, a homestead exemption
was granted by the Territorial statutes. These statutes however, were revised when state-
hood was attained. See Dak. Comp. Laws §2449 et seq. (1887); In re Teiten's Estate,
63 N.D. 729, 249 N.W. 913 (1933); Calmer v. Calmer, 15 N.D. 120, 106 N.W.
684 (1906).
4. "To give an insolvent debtor a fine house to live in without any means to support
his family would be an injury to his creditors without a corresponding benefit to the
debtor." Clark v. Shannon, 1 Nev. 568, 571 (1865). It is intended for the protection
and preservation of the home for the benefit of the family as a whole. Bremseth v. Olson,
16 N.D. 242, 245, 112 N.W. 1056, 1057 (1907). The laws relating to it are to be
"liberally construed." Dieter v. Fraine, 20 N.D. 484, 128 N.W. 684, 686 (1910).
5. N.D. Rev. Code §§14-0709, 56-0102 (1943). For a discussion of homestead
laws generally, see Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1950);
Aycock, Homestead Exemption in North Carolina, 29 N.C. L. Rev. 143 (1950); Vance
Homestead Exemption Laws, 7 Ency. Soc. Sciences 441 (1932); Crosby and Miller, Our
Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 Fla. L. Rev. 12, 219, 346
(1949); Note, The Illinois Homestead Exemption, 1950 111. L. Forum 99; Notes, 97 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 677 (1949); 46 Yale L. J. 1023 (1937); Waples, Homestead and Ex-
emption (1893).
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parent.6 For this reason the statutes permit a surviving wife, hus-
band or child to claim what is denominated a homestead "estate,"
continuing in the case of a surviving wife or husband until death
or remarriage, and in the case of surviving children until the
youngest attains majority. 7 The rather fine-spun distinction be-
tween a homestead "estate" and a homestead "exemption" is often
confusing and appears to reflect, at least to some extent, a conflict
in theory arising from the divergent ends which the statute seeks
to attain. It has been suggested that the statutes should have been
drafted throughout on the "exemption" rather than "estate" theory.8
Homestead laws are widespread, having been enacted in most of
the states, but they differ widely in the protection they afford.9
North Dakota's law on the subject is therefore not sui generis, al-
though several of the specific provisions of the statutes may merit
such a description. This Note will not undertake a comprehensive
analysis of the various state schemes, since the innumerable vari-
ations in detail from state to state make broad generalizations of
little value. It is proposed instead to take up the subject primarily
in terms of local precedent and statutes, discussing those problems
which appear to possess the greatest general interest.
Nature of Interest Required for Claim of Homested
It is well settled that although the claimant's interest in the
property claimed as a homestead may be negligible, some interest
or estate in the land is necessary before a homestead exemption
may be successfully asserted.1 This estate may be equitable in
6. There can be little question that the statutes represent in many respects a sub-
stantial improvement over dower and curtesy. They give, for instance, protection to minor
children whereas the common law did not do so except through the institution of ward-
ship-and wardship redounded to the benefit of the guardian more than it did to the child.
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 478-79 (2d ed. 1936). Moreover,
the homestead interest may be acquired without conforming to the over-technical rules of
the common law regulating dower or curtesy. Thus a woman who claimed dower had to
prove (1) marriage, (2) that her husband was seized of property during coverture, and
(3) that his interest in the property was of a kind which his children by the wife claim-
ing dower could have inherited. Plucknett, supra, at 507. In contrast, the homestead
interest extends to equitable estates where dower did not, and in cases where the husband
owns only one tract of land, the homestead allowance is more generous than the common
law right. The wife gets a life estate in all the homestead property, rather than in one-
third of it. In the case of a man who owned a great deal of land, however, the dower
right appears to be more generous than the homestead allowance. And from the stand-
point of a surviving husband, the homestead estate is less ample than was the common
law estate by the curtesy; the estate by the curtesy was a life interest in all the wife's
lands, not just in a limited portion of them.
7. N.D. Rev. Code §30-1602 (1943).
8. See Thormodsgard, Homesteads, 24 N.D. Bar Briefs 123 (1948).
9. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1950); for a gen-
eral survey of the state statutes, see 3 vernier, American Family Laws 638-58 (1935).
10. "The rule seems to be'well settled that while a very limited estate in the land,
perhaps a mere leasehold interest, may be sufficient to support a claim of homestead,
some estate in the land is essential." Myrick v. Bill, 3 Dak. 284, 17 N.W. 268, 271
(1883).
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character." Thus a person in possession of land under a contract
to purchase has an interest in the land to which a homestead will
attach as against all persons save the holder of the legal title. 2
Similarly, an entryman who lives with his family under a certifi-
cate of entry upon government land with the purpose of ultimately
getting a patent thereto may acquire a homestead right in the
premises."
If a homestead claimant is married, the homestead may be
selected by one spouse though the title be in the other.14 In one
case a woman who was living on her own land moved to and
established a home on her husband's land a few days after their
marriage. She continued to live on the premises after he deserted
her. It was held that she might claim a homestead exemption in
the property.1 It has also been held that an undivided interest in
land is sufficient to support a homestead exemption."6
Who May Claim a Homestead Exemption
The Constitution of North Dakota, as already noted, grants the
right to a homestead exemption only to one who is the "head of the
family." The term, however, is not defined in the Constitution and
for a precise interpretation it is necessary to turn to the statutes:
"The phrase 'head of a family'. . . shall mean:
1. The husband or wife when the claimant is a married
person, but in no case are both husband and wife en-
titled each to a homestead;
2. Every person who has residing on the premises with
him and under his care and maintenance, either:
a. His child or the child of his deceased spouse,
whether by birth or adoption;
b. A minor brother or sister or the minor child of a
deceased brother or sister;
c. A father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother;
d. The father or mother or grandfather or grand-
mother of a deceased husband or wife; and
e. An unmarried sister or any other of the relatives
mentioned in this section who have attained the age
of majority and are unable to take care of or sup-
port themselves."
7
11. Helgebye v. Dammen, 13 N.D. 167, 100 N.W. 245 (1904).
12. Ferris v. Jensen, 16 N.D. 462, 114 N.W. 372, 375 (1907); Helgebye v. Dam-
men, 13 N.D. 167, 100 N.W. 245 (1904); Roby v. Bismarck Nat. Bank, 4 N.D. 156,
59 N.W. 719 (1894); Myrick v. Bill, 5 Dak. 167, 37 N.W. 369 (1888).
13. First National Bank of Van Hook v. Zook, 50 N.D. 423, 196 N.W. 507 (1923).
14. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1803 (1943). See Bremseth v. Olson, 16 N.D. 242, 112
N.W. 1056 (1907).
15. Swingle v. Swingle, 36 N.D. 611, 162 N.W. 912 (1917).
16. Proefrock v. American Nat. Bank, 65 N.D. 308, 258 N.W. 482 (1935).
17. N.D. Rev. Code 147-1802 (1943).
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From the above provision one might conclude that the term is
exhaustively defined, but the cases demonstrate that the matter is
not completely settled. The husband is ordinarily the head of the
family. The wife does not, merely as a result of the conjugal rela-
tion, occupy the status of the head of a family for the purpose of
claiming a homestead exemption.' The wife may, however, be
compelled to accept the burden of maintaining the family and in
such cases the law concedes to her the family headship for the pur-
pose of claiming exemption.' It has been said that exemptions
are a family right and not personal to the head of a family; in
consequence, the wife and children are not bound by the failure
of a husband to claim them, and have a reasonable time to do So.
2
1
In Dieter v. Fraine,2 the husband left North Dakota and took a
claim of 160 acres in Washington under the desert land law of the
United States. Subsequently a judgment creditor of both the hus-
band and wife levied execution against the property owned in fee
by the wife in North Dakota. The wife set up the defense of home-
stead but the husband did not join in the claim. The court held, in
accordance with the principles stated above, that the homestead
exemption is given to the head of a family in a representative
capacity for the benefit of the family as a whole.2- It was said that
the homestead of a* family is completely exempt and the exemption
is not presumed waived by the failure or neglect of the family head
to claim it expressly. In an early case, 3 it was argued that the
statute as it then stood 24 permitted a construction which would
allow a single man without dependents to declare a homestead
exemption. The court rejected this contention.
An interesting case in which the court found there was no home-
stead was Holcomb v. HolcombY' The title to the property in
question was in the husband. A divorce and custody of a minor
child were granted the wife, and shortly thereafter the husband
died. The court reasoned that since the husband was not married
and had no dependents living with him at the time of his death,
18. Bremseth v. Olson, 16 N.D. 242, 112 N.W. 1056 (1907); Ness v. Jones, 10
N.D. 578, 88 N.W. 706 (1901).
19. See cases cited note 18, supra.
20. First International Bank v. Lee, 25 N.D. 197, 141 N.W. 716 (1913).
21. 20 N.D. 484, 128 N.W. 648 (1910).
22. Id. at 489, 128 N.W. at 686.
23. McCanna v. Anderson, 6 N.D. 482, 71 N.W. 769 (1897).
24. "Every family, whether consisting of one or more persons, in actual occupancy of
a homestead as defined in this chapter, shall be deemed and held to be a family within
the meaning of this chapter." Dak. Comp. Laws §2467 (1887).
25. 18 N.D. 561, 120 N.W. 547 (1909).
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there was no "head of a family" and therefore no homestead. A
dissent argued that the husband was still responsible for the sup-
port and maintenance of the child, and since the residence of the
child was legally that of the father, even though custody had been
awarded the mother, the father was at the time of his death the
head of the family and a homestead existed which could pass to
the minor child.
Requirement of Residence on the Homestead
To establish a homestead exemption the claimant must reside
upon the land which is the subject of the homestead claim.26 The
case of Tromsdahl v. Nass2 7 indicates that residence upon the tract
is required of the family as well as the head of the family. In that
case the husband came from Sweden and established residence in
this state. His wife and six children remained in Sweden but in-
tended eventually to come here. The court held that mere intent
not coupled with any definite action to bring the family to this state
was not sufficient to bring the claimant within the homestead laws.
Similarly it has been held that although a husband has established
a federal homestead by placing a shack upon land and visiting the
premises occasionally, no homestead exemption was claimable
where it was shown that the wife had never actually lived on the
land and apparently had no intention of doing so.2 8
On the other hand, there are some circumstances in which the
residence may be constructive rather than actual in character.2 9
Thus, when a home is established within a reasonable time after
completion of the dwelling, property purchased and improved for
a homestead may be exempt before the actual period of residence
begins.2 0 Nor does a tract of land necessarily cease to be a home-
stead simply because at a particular time there is no house upon it
fit to live in. The absence of a house may be explained and it may
be made to appear to the court that the land is a homestead and
that its owners fully intend to rebuild a home and dwell upon the
land as such.31
26. Smith v. Spafford, 16 N.D. 208, 112 N.W. 965 (1907).
27. 27 N.D. 441, 146 N.W. 719 (1914).
28. Brokken v. Bauman, 10 N.D. 453, 88 N.W. 84 (1901).
29. Brokken v. Bauman, supra note 28.
30. Sexton v. Sutherland, 42 N.D. 509, 174 N.W. 214 (1919). See also in re Mal-
loy, 179 Fed. 942 (W.D.N.D.), rev'd, 188 Fed. 788 (8th Cir. 1910) (property acquired
by a bachelor may be exempt as homestead provided he takes steps to actually reside
thereon within a reasonable time after marriage); Mandan Mercantile Co. v. Sexton, 29
N.D. 602, 151 N.W. 780 (1915) (holding that a homestead exemption existed from
time of completion of house though actual period of residence did not begin until after a
year, the house being occupied in the interim by tenants).
31. Edmonton v. White, 8 N.D. 72, 76 N.W. 986 (1898).
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Limitations As To Area
The code provides that the area of the property subject to home-
stead rights is limited to two acres if within a town plat and one
hundred and sixty acres if not within a town plat.32 Where the
head of a family owns a section of land and his dwelling house
stands upon a particular quarter-section of it, he may select his
homestead from any portion of the total section which best suits
his convenience and interests, subject only to the limitations that
the homestead must include the dwelling house and connot exceed
one hundred and sixty acres. However, if no homestead has been
selected from property embracing a larger area than that allowable
as a homestead and no homestead declaration has been filed for
record as provided by law, no presumption arises that the debtor
claims as his homestead the particular quarter-section on which the
house stands. Under such circumstances the claimant must assert
a homestead in some specific portion of the section or his exemption
will be waived. 3  The burden of proving a homestead exemption
is on the party asserting it.
34
Section 47-1818 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 pro-
vides that:
"In order to select a homestead the husband or other head
of the family, or in case the husband has not made such selec-
tion, the wife, must execute and acknowledge, in the same
manner as a grant of real property is acknowledged, a decla-
ration of homestead and file the same for record."
The recording of this declaration gives notice to all purchasers
and other parties dealing with or extending credit to the owner of
the exact land claimed as a homestead, thus giving a rough basis
on which to form an estimate as to the value of his non-exempt
assets. This is probably the main, and perhaps the only, reason for
this provision since the failure to make or file the declaration does
not render the homestead liable in execution,35 unless the claimant
fails to make a declaration where the property subject to the allow-
able homestead exceeds the permissible area as in the case pre-
viously noted.
32. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1801 (Supp. 1953).
33. Foogman v. Patterson, 9 N.D. 254, 83 N.W. 15 (1900).
34. Ruble v. Grafton National Bank, 64 N.D. 129, 250 N.W. 784 (1933); Johnson
v. Barton, 23 N.D. 629, 137 N.W. 1092 (1912); Currie v. Look, 14 N.D. 482, 106
N.W. 131 (1.906).
35. Birks v. Globe International Protective Bureau, 56 N.D. 613, 218 N.W. 864
(1928); Roshalt v. Meheus, 3 N.D. 513, 57 N.W. 783 (1894); ,N.D. Rev. Code.§47-
1817 (1943).
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In Proefrock v. American Nat. Bank,36 the homestead claimant
was a tenant in common of a 320 acre tract, his interest being an
undivided one-third. It was conceded that the claimant was the
head of a family and entitled to a homestead exemption, but it was
claimed that the homestead exemption should be limited to one
hundred and sixty acres of land, where as the claimant was assert-
ing such a right in three hundred and twenty acres. The court said
the homestead claimant was well within his rights, since his one-
third interest in the half section came to less than the allowable one
hundred and sixty acres.
Limitations As To Value
In terms of liberality of treatment toward debtors, the North
Dakota statutes defining the value and area of the homestead must
be ranked as among the most generous in the country.3 7 The code
provides that:
"The homestead of every head of the family residing in this
state shall consist:
1. If within a town plat, of not to exceed two acres of land
upon which the claimant resides, and the improvements
thereon, and not exceeding in value $25,000 over and above
liens or encumbrances or both.
38
2. If not within a town plat, of not to exceed in the aggregate
more than one hundred sixty acres, and the dwelling house
situated thereon in which the homestead claimant resides,
with all its appurtenances, and all other improvements on
said land regardless of the value of the same."3
9
The favorable treatment given to rural homestead claimants in
comparison to those claiming urban homesteads is typical of similar
provisions in comparable states, but the value limitations raise
some interesting questions. 0 In the first place, if the homestead is
36. 65 N.D. 308, 258 N.W. 482 (1935).
37. Most states have permitted the limitations as to value in respect to homestead
exemptions to become outdated. Thus, most of them place it at $1,000. Haskins, supra
note 9, at 1291.
38. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1801 (1) (Supp. 1953).
39. Id. §47-1801 (2) (1943).
40. North Dakota is not the only state which gives a homestead of theoretically
unlimited value to rural claimants. Kansas is even more generous, placing no ceiling
whatever on the value of even an urban homestead. Kan. Gen. Stat. §60-3501 (1949).
Minnesota is in accord with Kansas on the point. Minn. Stat. Ann. §510.02 (1947).
South Dakota does not include a value limitation in its homestead statute, S.D. Code
§51.1710 (1939), but stipulates, doubtless in deference to its history, that the home-
stead cannot include a gold or silver mine. Ibid. §42.0101. In California, on the other
hand, this is perfectly permissible. Gaylord v. Place, 98 Cal. 472, 33 Pac. 484 (1893).
Nebraska limits homesteads to a value of $2,000 and 160 acres in the country or two
contiguous lots in town. Neb. Rev. Stat. §40-101 (1943). Montana places a limit of
$2,500 upon homesteads though they may consist of 320 acres in the country. In town
they are limited to one-fourth of an acre. Mont. Rev. Code §6968 (1939). Wisconsin
draws no distinction between urban and rural homesteads, limiting them to 40 acres
and $5,000. Wis. Stat. §§272.20, 370.01 (46) (1949).
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outside a town plat its value may be theoretically unlimited under
the provisions quoted above; it may include a "palace as well as
a hovel."4' At one time the court seemed to feel that the use to
which the homestead property was put had to be appropriate to
its use as a residence, so that the homestead-at least when urban
in character-had to be of a primarily residential character. 42 But
no such restrictions appears in the statutes or the constitutional
provisions on the subject and later cases appear to have abandoned
this view.43 Apparently a homestead claimant may use it for any
desired commercial purpose so long as he continues to reside on the
property.
One difficulty immediately apparent stems from the fact that the
statute cited above appears to be inconsistent with the provision of
the State Constitution granting the right of homestead. The Con-
stitution of North Dakota specifically states that the value of a home-
stead "shall be limited and defined by law." 44 This requirement has
been met in the case of the urban homestead through the insertion
of a maximum value of $25,000 in the statute; but not even formal
compliance seems to have been made in the section regulating
rural homesteads, since these specifically include all improvements
on the land "regardless of the value. ' ' Possibly, if the matter were
one of first impression, it might be argued that the word "limited"
in the North Dakota Constitution does not necessarily imply a
maximum value on the homestead property, but simply means that
the value should be "established." Such usage is conventional in
deeds, in which the words by which the estate conveyed is "limited"
are merely those which define or establish the kind and quality of
the interest passed to a grantee. But both legislative history and
judicial utterance tip the scales against such a construction.
To illustrate the point, reference may be made to the fact that
prior to the attainment of statehood the permissible area of the
homestead was limited by the Dakota Territory laws, but no re-
striction was placed on value.4" After the constitutional provision
which is the root of the difficulty was enacted, however, the Legis-
41. See Calmer v. Calmer, 15 N.D. 120, 125, 106 N.W. 684, 686 (1906).
42. Calmer v. Calmer, supra note 41.
43. "The law does not say what kind of a home or what kind of buildings shall be
built on the homestead premises." In re Teiten's Estate, 63 N.D. 729, 737, 249 N.W.
913, 916 (1933). See Note, 114 A.L.R. 209 (1938) (the majority conclusion is that
the use of homestead for commercial purposes does not cause it to lose its exempt
character).
44. N.D. Const., Art. XVII, §208. (Emphasis supplied).
45. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1801 "(2) (1943).
46. Dak. Comp. Laws §2456 (1887).
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lative Assembly promptly proceeded to establish a ceiling of $5,000
on the permissible value of both urban and rural homesteads.
4 7
Judicial discussion of the reason for this change in the statutes indi-
cates that the court believed at the time that such a ceiling was
necessary to comply with the Constitution.4" It seems reasonably
clear, therefore, that some sort of maximum value limitation ought
to be inserted in the provision, 9 but it may be added that so long
as some sort of a ceiling is set it would appear immaterial from
the standpoint of meeting the requirements of the constitutional
provision in question precisely where it is put."0
A further important question of the same general class concerns
the methods used to determine the value of specific homesteads."1
To grasp the point, a brief discussion of some early cases is neces-
sary. In Calmer v. Calmer,52 the court was confronted by a contro-
versy between a widow claiming a homestead interest in property
subject to a mortgage and the sons of her deceased husband. The
land was worth $7,000. The mortgage was for $2,800. The amount
of the homestead exemption allowable under the statute in effect
at the time was $5,000. The homestead claimant contended that
the amount of the mortgage should be deducted from the appraised
value of the property and that the remainder was therefore totally
exempt as a homestead since the remaining unencumbered value
was only $4,200. This position was rejected by the court, which
held that a "mortgage or lien upon the property does not diminish
the value either of the property itself or the homestead claimant's
47. N.D. Laws 1891, c. 67, J1.
48. "The revision and amendment of 1891 was . . . necessary and evidently the
main reason for that enactment was to comply with the constitutional mandate to ;Ix a
limit of value on the homestead exemption." Calmer v. Calmer, 15 N.D. 120, 126, 106
N.W. 684, 686 (1906). The case of In re Teiten's Estate, 63 N.D. 729, 249 N.W. 913
(1933) rejected the reasoning of a Kansas decision that only property used for residential
purposes was exempt as a homestead and stated: "The reasoning, of course, does not
apply to a statute which limits the value of the homestead, as does the statute of North
Dakota." 63 N.D. at 737, 249 N.W. at 916.
49. The North Dakota Constitution clearly permits the Legislative Assembly to exer-
cise the widest discretion in establishing the limit wherever the legislators may happen
to want it, so long as a limit is actually set. There is thus no reason why the legisla-
ture could not meet the requirement of the Constitution by placing the limit for rural
homesteads so high the homestead exemption would be unlimited in value for all practical
purposes. Of course, if the disparity in value between rural and urban homesteads be-
came so great it amounted to an unreasonable classification between rural and urban
homestead claimants, there might be presented a question of the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
50. It -does not seem possible to argue that if the statute is held invalid, a home-
stead could be claimed by virtue of the constitutional provision alone. See Roesler &
White v. Taylor, 3 N.D. 546, 548, 58 N.W. 342, 343 (1894).
51. At present this problem arises only in connection with homesteads located within
a town plat.
52. 15 N.D. 120, 106 N.W. 684 (1906).
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estate therein."53 Hence it was ruled that the value of the property
claimed exceeded the permissible homestead exemption by $2,000.
In other words, where the value exceeds the statutory limit and the
property is encumbered, the question is whether the encumbrance
should be satisfied out of the allowable homestead value or the ex-
cess value. The court in the Calmer case held that it should be
satisfied out of the homestead value.
In a later case,54 precisely the same problem was presented in
more serious form. A husband and wife executed a first mortgage
on their homestead for $2,500. Later the husband executed a
second mortgage, without the joinder of his wife, for $2,000. The
second mortgagee brought suit to foreclose and the district court
found that the value of the land was $7,200. It held that after
deducting the first mortgage from the value of the land only $4,700
remained and since the exemption was $5,000 the second mortgage
did not attach. The Supreme Court reversed this decision on the
theory of the Calmer case, holding that a valid prior existing
mortgage executed by both the husband and wife should not be
deducted. It was also ruled that the mortgage executed by the
husband alone was valid as to the excess in value above the home-
stead estate. Since the prior mortgage was executed by both
spouses it operated as a lien upon the homestead. To deduct this
mortgage out of the excess value above the homestead exemption,
the court said, would simply serve to place the first mortgage in a
position similar to that of a mortgage which did not cover the
homestead estate. Justice Grace dissented, stating in effect that
since the homestead involved a tract of 160 acres and did not exceed
the permissible area limitations any conveyance without the joinder
of the landowner's spouse was expressly declared void by statute
regardless of value. This should be so, he argued, even though the
homestead might have been levied on under execution for the
enforcement of a judgement and the interest of the homestead
claimants over the $5,000 limit subjected to the satisfaction of the
judgement.
53. Id. at 128, 106 N.W. at 687. The opinion continues: "The occupant's estate
in the property is not diminished by a lien or mortgage. His estate remains as before,
and the mortgage or lien merely gives the creditor so secured a right to collect the debt
out of the debtor's estate in the land if the debt is not otherwise discharged. . . [An
opposite result would mean that] notwithstanding the divisibility of the property, the
whole of it would be exempt regardless of value." (Emphasis supplied). As pointed out
hereinafter, the rule of the Calmer case was reversed by the legislature in a subesequent
amendment to the statute. Th statutory provision involved thus raises its own question
of constitutionality. See text following note 56, infra.
54. First National Bank v. Hallquist, 48 N.D. 263, 184 N.W. 269 (1921).
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In 1923 the legislature adopted at least in part the position taken
by the dissenting justice and amended the statutes to provide that
the homestead should not exceed in value $5,000 over and above
liens or incumbrances and that a homestead could not be conveyed
or incumbered unless the instrument of transfer was executed or
acknowledged by both spouses without regard to the value of the
homestead. 5 This did not, however, fully meet the objections
raised in the dissenting opinion. It was still true that if the spouses
jointly executed a mortgage for $5,000, a judgment creditor could
reach the excess in value of the homestead over and above the in-
cumbrance and $5,000 exemption. To illustrate, if the 160 acres of
a homestead were worth $16,000, a judgment creditor in the case
supposed could still reach $6,000. To this extent, at least, the area
exemption was regarded as modified and overridden by the value
provisions of the statute. This result served in part to defeat the
purposes of the rural homestead exemption, as well, since the in-
come of the rural homestead claimant was supposed to be derived
chiefly from the land and a partial taking would decrease the in-
come proportionately. 5
But the main question regarding the statute as amended is simply
whether or not it is constitutional. It is obvious that in the case of
an urban homestead with a value of $40,000, subject to a $3,000
mortgage, a total of $28,000 is withdrawn from the grip of creditors.
A precisely similar homestead of equal value, but subject to a
$15,000 mortgage, is completely exempt. Theoretically, the larger
the incumbrance the more property is withdrawn from the reach of
creditors. There is no reason why the incumbrance could not be
of any amount the parties desired and the extent of the homestead
exemption varied accordingly. 5" Whether this is consistent with the
requirement that the homestead be limited in value appears never
to have been determined.
A further question concerning the limitations on the value of
homesteads arises in con aection with the homestead estate taken
by a surviving spouse ov minor child on the death of a person in
whom the fee to property constituting a homestead is vested. In
such a situation, as already indicated, the surviving spouse gets
an estate for life or until remarriage, or in the case of surviving
55. N.D. Laws 1923, c. 229, §1; Id. c. 230, §2.
56. First National Bank v. Hallquist, 48 N.D. 263, 184 N.W. 269 (1921). The
fact the Constitution provides the homestead shall not be subject to forced sale does rot
affect this result.
57.- See note 53, supra.
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children until the youngest attains majority.' Thus, in the case
of a husband who dies intestate leaving a wife and minor child,
the wife gets a homestead estate or interest for life or until re-
marriage5 9 together with a remainder in fee simple in one half of
the property,0 while the child also takes a one-half interest.61 As
to this there is no question. But now let it also be supposed that the
property claimed as a homestead would bring a return in excess of
the statutory limit if sold in fee simple. May it be so sold? The
case of Proefrock v. American National Bank"2 seems to say by way
of dictum that it is the value of the wife's life interest in the
property which is determinative in this situation. Thus, if the value
of the wife's life interest is placed at $25,000 but the value of the
property if offered on the market in fee simple is $50,000, the
Proefrock case seems to say that the entire property is exempt from
execution.
The question of whether the same result would obtain if the fee
were left to someone other than the wife, so that all she received
was a homestead life interest subject to defeasance upon remar-
riage, seems to be unanswered in North Dakota. The cases in other
jurisdictions have split on the point.
63
Right of Surviving Spouse to Homestead
Section 30-1602 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 pro-
vides that:
"Upon the death of a person in whom the title to real prop-
erty constituting a homestead is vested, a homestead estate
shall survive, and, until otherwise disposed of according to law,
shall be set over to the persons and in the order following:
1. To the surviving husband or wife for life or until he or she
again marries;
2. If there is no surviving husband or wife, to the decedent's
minor child or children, if any, until the youngest attains
majority; and
3. If the surviving husband or wife dies before the youngest
child attains majority, then after such death to the de-
cedent's minor child or children, if any, until the youngest
58. N.D. Rev. Code §30-1602 (1943).
59. N.D. Rev. Code §30-1604 (1943) (The real property subject to the homestead
estate shall descend subject to the full satisfaction of such estate). See also N.D. Rev.
Code §56-0104 (1943).
60. See note 59, supra.
61. See note 59, supra.
62. 65 N.D. 308, 258 N.W. 482 (1935).
63. Compare Wilson v. Devasher, 204 Ky. 408, 264 S.W. 1057 (1924), with Bank
of Columbia v. Gibbes, 54 S.C. 579, 32 S.E. 690 (1899); see Haskins, supra note 9,
at 1291 et seq.
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attains majority. If a surviving minor child dies before the
homestead estate has been terminated, such estate there-
after shall be dealt with as though such child had not lived."
By its terms, it will be noted, this section covers only the situation
where a decedent owned the title to the real property constituting
the homestead. It seems to say that if A and B are man and wife, A
owning the fee, and A dies, a homestead estate survives and is set
over to B. But read literally, the estate appears to be silent on the
converse situation where B dies and execution is then levied against
the property of A. Can A, in the situation posed, successfully main-
tain the defense that the property is exempt as a homestead?
Precisely this question came before the court in Healy v. Bis-
marck Bank,4 in which a wife held the fee simple title to the home-
stead property and the husband died. When the children reached
majority and left home, creditors levied execution on the property
on the theory the widow was no longer the "head of the family"
and hence could not longer claim a homestead exemption. The
court ruled, however, that the property was exempt as a home-
stead. In short, she was given two interests: a fee simple title to
the property plus a homestead exemption. 5
While the result seems at first blush inconsistent with the precise
wording of the statute quoted above, it would nevertheless appear
to be sound. The statutes on the books at the time of the case
specifically provided that on the death of either a husband or wife,
the surviving spouse might occupy the premises until remarriage
without regard to which of the two possessed title.-G In the process
of preparing the 1943 Revised Code, this section was consolidated
with §30-1602, supra, but the consolidation was not regarded as
"changing the meaning" of the statutes.67 Hence the rule of the
Healy case appears still to represent the law of North Dakota
When Homestead Is Not Exempt
The North Dakota Revised Code provides that:
"A homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satis-
faction of judgments obtained in the following cases:
64. 30 N.D. 628, 153 N.W. 392 (1915).
65. Accord, Meidinger v. Security Bank of Medina, 55 N.D. 301, 213 N.W. 850
(1927). In a later decision involving the same parties, the court later ruled that the
widow had abandoned the homestead. Hence a purchaser of the land from her took -t
subject to the lien of her creditors. O'Hare v. Bismarck Bank, 45 N.D. 641, 178 N.W.
1017 (1920).
66. "Upon the death of either husband or wife the survivor, so long as she do not
again marry, may continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead. N.D. Comp.
Laws §8723 (1913).
67. Notes of Code Revisors §30-1602 (1943).
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1. On debts secured by mechanics' or laborers' liens for work
or labor done or performed or material furnished exclusively
for the improvement of the same;
2. On debts secured by mortgage on the premises executed
and acknowledged by both husband and wife, or an un-
married claimant;
3. On debts created for the purchase thereof and for all taxes
accruing and levied thereon; and
4. On all other debts when it appears that said homestead is
within a town plat and, upon an appraisal as provided in
section 47-1806, it appears that the value of said homestead
is more than twenty-five thousand dollars over and above
liens or encumbrances thereon, and then only to the extent
of any value in excess of the sum total of such liens and en-
cumbrances plus said twenty-five thousand dollars."8
Section 47-1806 provides that if a judgement creditor does not
come under subsections 1, 2, or 3 of §47-1804, supra, and execution
is levied upon the homestead, the judgement creditor may apply to
the district court in the county in which such homestead is located
for the appointment of persons to appraise the value thereof. If the
appraisers' report indicates that the real property claimed as a
homestead can be divided without material injury, the court shall
direct the appraisers to set off so much of the real property as will
amount in value to the homestead exemption and execution may be
enforced against the remainder.6 9 If, on the other hand, the ap-
praisers' report shows that the homestead cannot be divided without
material injury and it exceeds in value the amount of the homestead
exemption, the court must direct a sale.7° The proceeds of such sale
to the amount of the homestead exemption must be paid to the
claimant and the residue applied to the satisfaction of the execution.
When the execution is against a husband whose wife is living, the
court may direct the amount of the exemption to be deposited in
the court to be paid out only on the joint receipt of the husband
and wife. This fund possesses all the protection against legal
process and voluntary disposition by the husband enjoyed by the
original homestead, whether paid directly to the claimant or to the
husband and wife jointly.
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The question often arises as to whether the proceeds from a vol-
untary sale of the homestead are exempt. There is a lack of case





law in this state directly in point, but the code provides that a con-
veyance or sale of the homestead renders the proceeds exempt so
far as the money received does not exceed the amount of the-home-
stead exemption. 72 This raises an obvious question: how far are
the proceeds from the sale of a homestead exempt in the case where
an owner sells an urban homestead for the purpose of purchasing
a rural homestead with the proceeds from the sale? The code ex-
pressly provides that the sale and disposition of one homestead
shall not be held to prevent the selection and purchase of another,
7 3
but on principle the answer would seem to be that the proceeds of
the sale should be exempt only in the amount of $25,000. On the
other hand, it should be noted that the courts generally hold that it
does not constitute a fraud upon creditors for a debtor who fears
insolvency to use his assets to purchase an exempt homestead.-,
Abandonment of Homestead
The homestead exemption ceases when the homestead is aban-
doned as a residence by the homestead claimant. However, physical
absence from the land does not in itself amount to abandonment.
It is merely evidence thereof, and while it is a fact to be taken into
consideration in determining whether an abandonment has occurred
it is not conclusive.75 While residence upon the property is a pre-
requisite to the claim of a homestead exemption,76 it has been held
that "temporary absence and the removal therefrom do not defeat
the right to homestead."77
It is the intention with which one removes from his residence
which is the determining factor in deciding whether the absence
amounts to an abandonment of the homestead. It must be shown
that the abandonment was voluntary and without an intention to
return and reoccupy the premises as a home.78 Thus absence from
the land for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and increas-
ed ease and comfort is not an abandonment of the homestead.
79
In Healy v. Bismarck Bank,80 already discussed, it was held that
72. Id. §47-1816.
73. Id. §47-1821.
74. Haskins, note 9 supra, at 1302-03; Note, 161 A.L.R. 1287 (1946). To this rule
there are, however, many execeptions.
75. Nelson v. Griggs County, 56 N.D. 729, 219 N.W. 225 (1928).
76. Brokken v. Baumann, 10 N.D. 453, 88 N.W. 84 (1901).
77. Smith v. Spafford, 16 N.D. 208, 212, 112 N.W. 965, 967 (1907); Edmonson
v. White, 8 N.D. 72, 76 N.W. 986 (1898).
78. Grotberg v. First National Bank, 54 N.D. 548, 210 N.W. 21 (1926).
79. Meidinger v. Security State Bank, 55 N.D. 301, 213 N.W. 850 (1927). See
also Nelson v. Griggs County, 56 N.D. 729, 219 N.W. 225 (1928); Grotberg v. First
National Bank, note 78, supra.
80. 30 N.D. 628, 153 N.W. 392 (1915).
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the homestead character of property remained even though the
premises were leased from month to month, when the claimant re-
tained a room in the house, occupied the room from time to time,
had furniture in it, and considered it her home at all times and in-
tended to return to it though she spent most of her time visiting her
children. Conversely in the later case of O'Hare v. Bismarck Bank,8
the court held that later acts of the same claimant showed aban-
donment of the homestead. In other words, a physical removal
may be quite consistent with an honest intent to retain the premises
with a homestead, and thereafter the intention may be changed so
that the home is established somewhere else.
It has been held that where a homestead claimant is imprisoned
and subsequently paroled and thereafter is given a job away from
the homestead and joined by his family, there is no abandonment
of the homestead in the absence of proof that the husband and
family did not intend to return.8 And where a husband was in-
ducted into the army and leased the homestead to another with
an option to purchase, the court found that where once a homestead
has been established its status is presumed to continue until aban-
donment is proved by clear and convincing evidence on the part of
the person alleging abandonment.
3
3
Nor does the mere offering of a homestead for sale show an intent
to abandon the homestead. "The owner of a homestead does not,
by resorting to every known means to sell such homestead, forfeit
his homestead rights therein."8 4 If the wife's homestead rights in
land are founded upon an equitable title in her husband under an
executory contract for the purchase of land, her rights thereto are
dependent on the rights of the husband under the contract and if
his equitable interest is extinguished she cannot claim a homestead
right in the property.-5 If the husband, as the head of the family,
acting in good faith voluntarily abandons the land on which he
lives and his family is removed therefrom, the land loses its home-
stead characters6 On the other hand, he cannot terminate his
wife's right to claim a homestead exemption by a unilateral act.'-
81. 45 N.D. 641, 178 N.W. 1017 (1920).
82. Schaf v. Corey, 50 N.D. 432, 196 N.W. 502 (1923).
83. Larson v. Cole, 76 N.D. 32, 33 N.W. 2d 325 (1948).
84. See Yellowhair v. Pratt, 44 S.D. 136, 182 N.W. 702, 705 (1921).
85. Ferris v. Jensen, 16 N.D. 462, 114 N.W. 372 (1907); Helgebye v. Dammen,
13 N.D. 167, 100 N.W. 245 (1904).
86. Blatchley v. Dakota Land & Cattle Co., 26 N.D. 532, 145 N.W. 95 (1914).
87. Schaf v. Corey, 50 N.D. 432, 196 N.W. 502 (1923).
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Conveying or Mortgaging the Homestead
Property occupied as a homestead by a married couple cannot be
conveyed or encumbered, regardless of its value, unless the deed or
mortgage is executed and acknowledged by both the husband and
wife.8 8 The courts have the statutory power to set aside property
subject to a homestead to the innocent party in a divorce pro-
ceeding, either absolutely or for a limited period of time.89 How-
ever, unless specific provision otherwise is made in the decree,
the homestead will remain in the possession of the party holding the
legal title discharged from all homestead rights or claims of the
other party. 0
The rule requiring both husband and wife to join in the convey-
ance of homestead property has caused many problems. In Yusko v.
Studt,1 a husband and his daughter executed and acknowledged
a mortgage without the knowledge of the wife.92 The court held
that the lien was of no effect even in the hands of an innocent pur-
chaser for value though the mortgage appeared completely regular
on its face. The parties acted on the advice of a notary public, and
it was said that while the notary's certificate raised a strong pre-
sumption of proper execution it could be impeached by clear and
conclusive testimony.
In Hazlett v. Mathieu 3 a husband and wife both signed a mort-
gage on their homestead but the wife did not have her signature
acknowledged. The wife claimed her signature was obtained by
fraud. The court held that in the absence of an acknowledgement
the instrument was void. 4 However, despite such holdings there
88. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1805 (1943). See also N.D. Rev. Code §1-0412 (1943),
validating under certain circumstances conveyances made by a wife or husband alone where
the other spouse subsequently executes a deed to the same property. It may be pointed
out that under the code a conveyance by a husband alone, followed by a conveyance by
the wife alone, both conveyances being to the same grantee, is normally ineffectual to pass
the homestead property. And see also N.D. Rev. Code §14-0712 (1943), which pro-
vides that in the case of abandonment or imprisonment of one of the spouses, the innocent
spouse has authority to file with the court for leave to make a conveyance. It should also
be noted that where a man gives a mortgage on property and only occupies it as a home-
stead thereafter, the mortgage is valid whether the wife joined in it or not. Kuhnert v.
Conrad, 6 N.D. 215, 69 N.W. 185 (1896).
89. N.D. Rev. Code §14-0525 (1943).
90. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 18 N.D. 561, 120 N.W. 547 (1909); Rosholt v. Mehus,
3 N.D. 513, 57 N.W. 783 (1894).
91. 37 N.D. 221, 163 N.W. 1066 (1917).
92. They contended this was done because the wife was sick and could not be present
to sign the conveyance. The wife's name was Anna and the daughter's name was Annie-
a coincidence sufficient to mislead even the most meticulous title examiner.
93. 57 N.D. 57, 220 N.W. 647 (1928).
94. Accord, Acklin v. First National Bank, 64 N.D. 577, 254 N.W. 769 (1934);
Rasmussen v. Stone, 30 N.D. 451, 152 N.W. 809 (1915); Severtson v. Peoples, 28 N.D.
372, 148 N.W. 1054 (1914).
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occur occasional situations in which an encumbrance signed by only
one spouse is upheld as against the defense that the property con-
stitutes a homestead. In State v. Stoelting" the husband transferred
the homestead to his wife and she in turn mortgaged it to a bank
of which the husband was an officer to take up an overdraft and
give the husband the cash balance. The husband did not join in
the mortgage. The homestead was thereafter mortgaged a second
time, both spouses joining, to a party who took with notice of the
prior mortgage. The court held all parties estopped to assert the
invalidity of the first mortgage, stating that it was never intended
that the homestead law should be so construed as to permit either
a constructive or actual fraud to be perpetrated. 91 The case con-
trasts interestingly with Kittel v. Straus,17 in which the wife joined
in a mortgage of the homestead with the understanding the mort-
gage was for security for the performance of a contract by the
husband. The obligee in the contract discovered fraud and rescind-
ed the contract but retained the mortgage under a prior agreement
with the husband. It was held that the wife had given the mortgage
for a specific purpose and the failure of that purpose gave her the
equitable right to have the mortgage cancelled so long as the
rights of innocent third parties had not attached.
In Mandan Mercantile Co. v. Sexton,9 8 a husband and wife pur-
chased a vacant lot and improved it for three years, finally erect-
ing a dwelling house and other buildings thereon. On comple-
tion of the house the husband mortgaged the property, the mort-
gage providing that the property "does not now and never has
constituted any part of his homestead." The court found the mort-
gage void because the premises constituted a homestead. It was
held the recital in the mortgage that the premises were not a home-
stead was not a covenant but merely amounted to a statement by
the husband which could not of itself operate to preclude the wife
from exercising her right of homestead in the premises.
In a relatively recent case a husband owned a tract of land which
constituted his homestead. On the land was a cabin in which he
allowed a woman who did clerical work for him to reside, the
clerical work forming the implied consideration for the use of the
95. 53 N.D. 736, 208 N.W. 101 (1926).
96. In Engholm v. Ekrem, 18 N.D. 185, 119 N.W. 35 (1909), the doctrine of
equitable estoppel was also applied. But cf. Yusko v. Studt, 37 N.D. 221, 163 N.W.
1066 (1917).
97. 47 N.D. 88i 181 N.W. 628 (1921).
98. 29 N.D. 602, 151 N.W. 780 (1915).
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cabin. The woman managed to induce the husband to sign a con-
veyance to her by fraud. Later she also managed to get the wife's
signature under false representations, had the deed notarized with
two witnesses attesting it and subsequently conveyed the land to
the county to satisfy a debt. The court found that the deed was
not acknowledged by the husband and wife jointly and was con-
sequently void.99
A wife who joins her husband in the execution of a mortgage on
the homestead given to secure his debt does not thereby become a
surety and is not entitled to notice of an extension of time for the
payment of the mortgage debt. 10 Nor is her consent to the exten-
sion necessary. 10' And a mortgage of homestead premises is sup-
ported by a consideration so far as the wife is concerned where she
executes the mortgage jointly with her husband as part of a tran-
saction whereby he obtains a renewal and extension of an existing
indebtedness owing by him alone.102
In Seifert v. Lanz'0 3 a homested claimant agreed in writing to ex-
change farms with another person. In conformity with the agree-
ment he deposited in escrow a deed to his land signed by himself
and his wife, but attempted to withdraw it and cancel the contract
before the other party had a reasonable opportunity to comply. It
was held that the wife's failure to sign the pre-existing contract of
sale did not give the husband a right to withdraw, since her joinder
in the deed constituted an adoption of the prior contract as her own.
It has been held that a deed from a husband to a wife of a home-
stead is valid although the wife does not join in the execution of the
deed because in such a conveyance there is no intention to divest
the wife of her rights or homestead protection. 10 4 A logical holding
is that of Kepner v. Ford,"°' in which a homestead claimant con-
tracted with a broker for the sale of his property, the contract
providing that the broker was to receive a commission if he found
a purchaser. On the tender of such a purchaser the broker became
entitled to his commission nothwithstanding the fact the property
consisted of a homestead and the wife did not join in the execution
of the contract. The agreement was held not to be a contract of sale
99. Nichols v. Schutte, 75 N.D. 207, 26 N.W.2d 515 (1947).
100. Onlie v. O'Toole, 16 N.D. 126, 112 N.W. 677 (1907); Roberts v. Roberts,
10 N.D. 531, 88 N.W. 289 (1901).
101. See cases cited note 100, supra.
102. First National Bank v.'Benson, 57 N.D. 117, 220 N.W. 645 (1928).
103. 29 N.D. 139, 150 N.W. 568 (1915).
104. Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 366 (1919).
105. 16 N.D. 50, 111 N.W. 619 (1907).
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but a mere undertaking on the owner's part to compensate the
broker for finding a purchaser.
Another interesting case is Swingle v. Swingle,"' where a hus-
band and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement whereby
each purported to release all rights in the property of the other,
whether arising by operation of law or otherwise. The court held
the agreement of no effect upon the rights of the wife in the home-
stead and denied validity to a deed executed by the husband alone.
Status of Judgment Liens
No discussion of encumbrances upon the homestead could over-
look the status of the judgment lien. A judgment properly dock-
eted according to statute is in this state a lien on all real property
except the homestead. '17 There are, however, instances in the books
in which judgment liens have been asserted to attach to property
claimed as a homestead and some interesting questions have de-
veloped. In one case,"' s a husband and wife living on a homestead
gave a valid mortgage. Later a judgment was entered against
them. When the mortgage was foreclosed they continued to live
on the property during the period allowed for redemption. The
court held that the judgment creditor could not make redemption
from the foreclosure sale. In First State Bank of Gackle v.
Fischer,"'1 A had a judgment lien against B. B thereafter acquired
real property but did not occupy it as a homestead until two years
had passed. A then sued to enforce his lien, but the district court
held the lien could not be enforced so long as the homestead was
held by B. 1 0 Subsequently B gave a valid mortgage to C and still
later transferred the property to his mother. A once again caused
execution to be issued on the judgment and at the sale received a
sheriff's certificate of purchase. C then sued A, claiming his mort-
gage was prior to the judgment lien. The supreme court held in
A's favor on the ground the lien of A attached when it was docketed
and the district court's ruling that A could not levy execution until
the homestead right ceased was superseded when B transferred the
property to his mother. Thus the lien had priority over the
mortgage. EDWARD BoscH.
106. 36 N.D. 611, 162 N.W. 912 (1917).
107. N.D. Rev. Code *28-2013 (1943).
108. Farmer's Bank of Mercer County v. Knife River Lumber and Grain Company, 37
N.D. 371, 163 N. W. 1053 (1917).
109. 67 N.D. 400, 272 N.W. 752 (1937).
110. No appeal was taken from the ruling of the district court, which appears to be
questionable. Cf. Kuhnert v. Conrad, 6 N.D. 423, 69 N.W. 185 (1896), cited and ex-
plained in note 88, supra. See Klemmens v. First National Bank of Cassopolis, 22 N.D.
304, 133 N.W. 1044 (1911) (judgment lien may be enforced when property ceases to be
homestead or appreciates in value in excess of allowable exemption).
